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ABSTRACT
Software safety ensures that software programs, which control complex
systems, perform within certain limits without resulting in an unacceptable risk
of an accident occurring. Petri Nets are used to model concurrent computer
systems by helping to understand complex interactions and paths of execution.
Fault Tree analysis is used to determine safety requirements by detecting
software logic errors. They also identify multiple failure sequences in a system
that can lead to safety hazards. Petri Nets and Fault Tree analysis can be
combined and used in conjunction with each other. They can take advantage
of each others inherent strengths. This combined methodology can provide
an efficient and effective safety analysis technique.
This thesis surveys software safety research and focuses on Petri Nets
and Fault Tree analysis. We discuss an extended example combining Petri
Nets and Fault Tree analysis. The example is a real-time, military embedded
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I. INTRODUCTION
Computers are increasingly being used as passive (monitoring) and active
(controlling) components of real-time systems, e.g., air traffic control,
aerospace, aircraft, industrial plants and hospital patient monitoring
systems. The problems of safety become important when these
applications include systems where the consequences of failure are
serious and may involve grave danger to human life and property.
[Ref. 1]
Increasingly, in the world today, the trend is to implement functionality
through software. Both the military and industry are becoming more and
more dependent on software products. Older weapons platforms are
undergoing system upgrades to significantly increase their service life that
includes additional digital hardware and software. In 1955 only 10 percent
of our weapons systems required computer software. Today the figure is well
over 80 percent [Ref. 2].
The increase in reliance on software has led to safety critical factors that
are significant. Since the techniques for software safety analysis are less
mature than those of hardware safety. Much remains to be learned about
applying safety considerations to the design and evaluation of computer-
controlled real-time systems. Many major safety critical system purchases are
now incorporating requirements for software safety analysis and verification
in their contracts [Ref. 3].
The military has responded by publishing several standards for testing
and verification of software systems. These include MIL-STD-SNS (1986),
MBL-STD-882B (1984), and MIL-STD-1574A (1979). MIL-STD-SNS (USN)
is a Navy standard that covers software safety analysis for nuclear weapons
systems. MIL-STD-882B (DOD) is a Department of Defense standard for
software hazard analysis and software safety verification. Finally
MIL-STD-1574A (USAF) is an Air Force standard that lists the requirements
for software safety analysis and integrated system safety. [Ref. 4]
Problems, however, still exist in verifying the safe states of software
controlled systems. The number of states in imbedded software systems
prohibit the realistic testing and verification of these systems. It is impossible
to simulate all the different types of hardware errors, transient faults, and
system interface errors in the design of a complex piece of software.
Therefore, the overall system view is critical. The greatest source of problems
encountered in computer controlled systems is in the lack of system level
methods and viewpoints. [Ref. 4]
A. WHAT IS SOFTWARE SAFETY?
In order to have a common place to start some preliminary working
definitions need to be presented. Complete safety cannot be achieved since
nothing is completely safe under all conditions. For example, the act of
drinking too much water can cause kidney failure [Ref. 5]. Therefore, safety
is a concept that needs to be measured with regards to the situation in which
it is being applied.
Safety can be defined in terms of hazards or undesired states of a
system. When these states are combined with other, perhaps totally unrelated,
environmental factors conditions exist that could lead to a mishap. Risk is
also a part of these factors. It is a function of the probability of the actual
hazardous state occurring. Secondly, once the hazardous state has occurred,
what is the probability of that hazard leading to a mishap? And finally, what
is the perceived severity of the worst potential mishap that could result from
the hazard? [Ref. 4]
Safety can then be defined as a measure of the degree of freedom from
risk in any environment. Software safety, therefore, can be considered
freedom from software failures that could cause damage or injury. Software,
however, is not inherently unsafe. It cannot, by itself, cause physical damage
or injury. The software acts in conjunction with hardware to do something
that can be physically accomplished. This physical task may then have the
chance to cause an incident or mishap.
Software and hardware must be treated as a single unit in order to be
analyzed. Software engineering techniques that do not consider the system as
a whole, including the interactions between the hardware, software, and human
operators, will have limited usefulness for real-time control software [Ref. 4].
Safety and reliability, although sometimes thought of as the same, are
not. This is especially true with respect to software. Safety is the probability
that a mishap or accident will not occur regardless of whether or not the
intended function is performed. Reliability is defined as the probability that
the system will perform its intended function for a specified period of time
under a set of specified environmental conditions. [Ref. 6]
In general, for a system to be reliable it must work correctly and be
failure free. The system is designed so that the software can react for every
possible software error. Safety is concerned with only those errors that cause
a system hazard. This is not to say that all software errors cause safety
problems and all software that functions according to the specifications is safe
[Ref. 3]. Serious mishaps have occurred while software was operating exactly
as intended and a failure was not present [Ref. 7j.
B. INTRODUCTION TO SOFTWARE SAFETY ANALYSIS
Software safety analysis needs to begin when a project is started and
continued throughout the life cycle of the system. A goal of any safety
analysis is to show that the system is safe. The system must be able to
operate safely under normal working conditions or the normal intended
conditions. It must also be able to respond safely with the presence of errors
or faults. Software or any software system must not let one simple fault
disrupt its operation. The system must prove that hazards resulting from
sequences of failures are also sufficiently remote. [Ref. 4]
To fully test or analyze all sequences of failures is, for all practical
purposes, impossible. Therefore, the safety analysis procedures must begin to
decompose the problems. An attempt must be made to define what is
hazardous and then judge the likelihood of its occurrence. This approach
lends itself to a backwards type of analysis. The hazards, once grouped, can
then be placed in severity categories with probabilities assigned to each
category. This can better define and focus which hazards would cause the
worst credible mishap. [Ref. 4]
Once the preliminary hazard analysis is completed, detailed software
hazard analysis can begin. The techniques in the initial stages of the analysis
focus on the most damaging failures. The method of analysis starts with a
given set of unacceptable failures and then by backward reasoning ensures that
each failure is eliminated or at least minimized in its severity. [Ref. 4]
One method that is used to model a system is timed Petri nets. Petri
nets (Peterson, 1981) allow mathematical modeling of discrete-event systems
in terms of conditions and events and the relationship between them [Ref. 4].
Faults and failures can then be incorporated into the Petri net model to
determine their effect on the system [Ref. 1].
Another verification methodology for safety analysis involves the use of
software fault tree analysis (SFTA) [Ref. 8]. Software fault tree analysis is
a static analysis of a system in order to ascertain software safety
requirements. The technique can also detect software logic errors and
identify multiple failure sequences involving different parts of the system.
The backward approach is once again used starting from the undesired event.
The sequence of actions are stepped through using gates to reach a
contradiction of the undesired event. [Ref. 4]
This thesis looks at the relationship and possible integration of Petri nets
and fault free analysis. Software updates to a weapons system occur quite
frequently over the life cycle of a system. New and more powerful computers
are added to many existing systems to increase their overall system
effectiveness. These factors have contributed to more and more software
being required to meet these needs. Exhaustive testing of software in many
cases is not feasible. Many older systems lack formal and stringent
specifications from the original system. Reverse engineering, therefore, is
performed on the update to ensure that the system works correctly. If the
update was limited in scope, testing can still be accomplished. However, with
today's complex and more sophisticated systems designers and implemented
will not have this luxury.
Certainly, for today's safety critical systems, as much testing that can be
done needs to done. However, new methodologies to analyze safety-critical
computer or software controlled systems need to be developed. Combining
Petri net analysis and fault tree applications may be one way to reduce the
number of states or events that must be inspected. Critical states that could
cause personal injury or property destruction must in some way be singled
out. If these critical states are recognized and analyzed appropriate action can
be taken.
Systems in many of today's applications are extremely complicated. In
order to assist in a safety evaluation the system must be fully understood.
Petri nets help in modeling the system in terms of conditions and events and
the relationship between them. Once the system is properly understood fault
tree analysis can be done in areas where possible problems exist. Today,
there are no easy or widely accepted software safety techniques that have been
validated completely [Ref. 4].
This thesis examines one particular real-life software upgrade. It then
evaluates a method to apply Petri net and fault tree analysis to the safety
issues associated with the upgrade. This analysis evaluates critical faults that
may exist in the software. This technique may help in finding and
eliminating safety critical faults in other software.
The actual system under investigation is the proposed upgrade to the
Operational Flight Program (OFP) 240 for the Grumman A-6E aircraft. The
proposed upgrade, named OFP 250, is under development at the Naval
Weapons Center in China Lake, California. Due to time constraints and levels
of expertise one specific weapon system was chosen for evaluation. The
actual safety analysis considered the additional functionality of the master arm
weapons switch. The ability to place the master arm switch in the practice
mode and interface with live weapons was not implemented in the previous
release. OFP 250 changes the function of the master arm switch to let the
aircrew practice and interface with live weapons carried on the aircraft. In
addition, three new computers were added immediately prior to the OFP 240
upgrade. These new computers added additional complexity to the master arm
practice problem.
II. BACKGROUND TO SOFTWARE SAFETY TECHNIQUES
A. SOFTWARE SAFETY DEFINITIONS
As software and computer programs have become larger the number of
bugs in these programs have also grown. The ability to test for all cases in
a large software program is, in practice, nearly impossible. At the same time,
our reliance on computers that do critical tasks has grown tremendously. In
order to deal with these inconsistencies, software safety has become a vital
piece of the total system safety puzzle. Software safety analysts have agreed
on certain definitions to help in defining this area of research. These
definitions are set down by the IEEE Standards Committee and will be
followed throughout this thesis [Ref. 9]. These definitions are listed in
Appendix A.
B. SOFTWARE FAILURE MODES
When designing software some knowledge of the different types of
failures that can occur should be understood. It has been fairly evident from
research and by example that software does not fail due to wear. Software
failures are actually program errors that exist in the system. Therefore, five
system failure modes can be defined:
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1. Premature operation of a component (operation not required or the
operation was too early). Error of commission.
2. Failure of a component to operate at a prescribed time (operation left
out of sequence or it was too late). Error of omission.
3. Failure of a component to cease operation at a prescribed time
(calculation takes too long or no termination condition, infinite loop).
4. Failure of a component during operation, i.e., incorrect output.
5. Failure of a component to recognize a hazardous condition that must
require some type of corrective action. [Ref. 10]
These identifiable failure modes should be the basis by which we begin
to analyze key conditions in a software system. [Ref. 11]
C. SYSTEM SOFTWARE APPROACHES
Five approaches can be identified that are currently being used to
enhance safety design. These are hazard elimination; hazard limitation; a
group of hardware and software mechanisms that includes lockouts, lockins,
and interlocks; fail-safe design; and failure minimization. A brief description
of each will follow.
Hazard elimination can be done during the design phase. As the design
continues to be inspected problems will be uncovered. Those design problems
that lead to hazards should be eliminated. However, the problems may be
dependent on hardware or the environment. A computer controlled insulin
pump is an example of how the environment can effect software. The insulin
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pump is set to monitor blood sugar levels in the body. A certain lower level
of blood sugar corresponds to an increase in insulin. However, there are
environmental factors such as diet or exercise that require different rates for
the pump to add the insulin to the body. The pump must be guaranteed not
to exceed a fixed maximum rate. Therefore, software cannot be the only
way to eliminate a hazard. Software and hardware must work in conjunction
to help solve the problem of hazards. In the above case software would need
to issue commands to ensure the pump acted correctly for the given set of
circumstances and blood sugar levels.
In software terms a hazard is an unsafe state. If the system is allowed
to enter an unsafe state this condition can lead to a mishap or safety failure.
The system was able to proceed to the unsafe state by a series of critical
faults that produced a critical error. Therefore, to eliminate the unsafe state it
is necessary to try and eliminate these prior errors and faults.
Some of the techniques that help eliminate hazards include formal
requirements and specification languages, design tools, preliminary hazard
analysis (PHA), fault tree analysis (FTA), and Petri net analysis. [Ref. 11]
Hazard limitation is another piece of the puzzle to help enhance safety
design by reducing the scope of the hazard, thereby limiting the problem.
The idea is to detect the hazardous condition at a low enough energy level to
insure that sufficient time remains to take a recovery action.
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Monitor systems must be extremely reliable. The program must be able
to continually check and cross check conditions. These monitoring programs
can be implemented in software. However, the software must not only
monitor the situation but also take action. Warnings can be used in
conjunction with the monitoring system. An aural warning for a radar
altimeter set to a desired altitude or an automatic fly-up while on a terrain
following mission are examples of the performance needed by monitoring
software. [Ref. 11]
Lockouts, lockins, and interlocks are based on two principles:
1. isolate a hazard once it has been recognized
2. prevent incompatible events from occurring, from occurring at the
wrong time, or from occurring in the wrong sequence [Ref. 10].
These mechanisms are designed to be accomplished primarily through
hardware. A lockout prevents entering an unsafe state or prevents an event
from actually occurring. A lockin maintains an event or keeps something
from leaving a safe state. Interlocks are the mechanisms provided to avoid
timing failures by ensuring that events happen in the correct order. Many of
these features have been used for operating systems problems. The types of
mechanisms that deal with these problems are semaphores, monitors, and
kernels. Therefore, it should be safe to assume that the experience gained
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from applying these techniques to operating systems will aid in safety critical
applications. [Ref. 11]
Fail-Safe design tries to ensure that when a failure happens the system
will remain in a safe state. The system will try to remain in or reach a state
in which no damage or injury can result. Fail-Safe design can be categorized
into three types: fail-passive, fail-active, and fail-operational. These fail-
safe designs are described below:
1
.
Fail-passive design reduces a system to its lowest energy level in the
event of a failure (e.g., disarming a missile after a certain period of
time). A circuit breaker type fuse for the system. It should be used
when no action by the system is a safe action.
2. Fail-active (fail-soft) design reduces the energy level of the other
system in a stepwise fashion in the event of a failure. It should be
used in systems when there is some degree of system activity that
must be maintained to remain safe. Malfunctioning components are
modularized. Each module can be independently terminated. This
avoids a total crash of the system (e.g., water valves for cooling a
nuclear power plant remain open while the system makes critical re-
calculations on data).
3. Fail-operational design (fault-tolerance) ensures full system
functionality in the event of a failure. It uses redundancy (parallel
or switching) for critical modules that are required to maintain safety
(e.g., an automatic hands off landing system for aircraft). [Ref. 11]
The last method is failure minimization. Some software systems are so
vital that they cannot afford to fail. Therefore, the actual number of times
the system fails must be reduced. One way to meet these goals is to try and
limit failures especially under heavy load conditions. If the system is going
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to fail, it is hopefully at a time when system operation can be continued in
some other manner.
Redundancy is used in many cases in fail minimization systems. This
does, however, become expensive. The same software cannot be used as the
backup since it will have the same errors as the front line system. Different,
independent software must be developed and tested to ensure that the backup
works correctly. [Ref. 11]
Research continues to try and help in ways to develop methods that
provide for techniques that aid in software safety. One goal is to produce
safe designs for software, while at the same time, maintain system
performance [Ref. 12]. Another concern is to develop ways to analyze
already existing software. The design must be able to find failure modes or
scenarios that could lead to a specific safety failure. Two techniques that can
assist in the development and analyzing of safe software are fault tree analysis
(FTA) and Petri net analysis. These two techniques will be presented for
modeling of components in a system. The analysis that is done on the system
will show that the information gathered can identify safety area concerns and
be useful in further software safety design.
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D. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
Fault tree analysis (FTA) was developed in the early 1960's to analyze
the safety of electro-mechanical systems [Ref. 13]. Evolving from FTA was
software fault tree analysis (SFTA). This extended the concepts into systems
that contained software as subcomponents. FTA starts by defining an
undesired system state or hazard. The system is analyzed in the context of
its environment and operation to find a plausible sequence of events that can
lead to a hazard. The fault tree is essentially a graphic model of various
parallel and sequential combinations of events or system states. The result of
these combinations is the occurrence of the predefined undesired event or
proof that the undesired event cannot occur.
The undesired event could occur due to component failure, human error,
or environmental conditions. Therefore, the fault tree depicts the logical
interrelationship of basic events that lead to an undesired event. [Ref. 14]
It is also important to understand what a fault tree is not. It is not a
model of all possible system failures or reasons the system may fail. Each
particular fault tree must be tailored to its singular, corresponding, failure
scenario. With the possibility of an almost infinite number of ways leading
to an undesired event the path chosen is the one most credibly decided on by
the analyst.
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E. SOFTWARE FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
Software fault tree analysis begins in a manner much like hardware fault
tree analysis. The software approach uses a subset of the symbols used in
hardware analysis (Appendix B). This allows software and hardware trees to
be interfaced, linked, and analyzed together. It also allows for greater
freedom in order to include human error and hardware failure during the
analysis. [Ref. 15]
The basic procedure for FTA starts with identifying a hazard that has or
could occur. The hazard is the root of the fault tree. The nodes below are
the necessary preconditions that are needed to have the hazard occur. The tree
builds in a backward way to determine the possible paths that may lead to
this particular hazard. These relationships are built by using AND or an OR
gate until each subnode has been analyzed to the lowest possible level. [Ref.
14]
After the fault tree has been built to the software interface, higher level
requirements for software safety can be delineated. Unsafe software behavior
may result from any number of conditions. Some examples include the
failing to perform a required function, performing a function not required,
failing to enforce a required sequence, or failing to recognize a hazardous
condition. [Ref. 14]
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Once the system has been modeled by the FTA the hazardous software
behavior can be further modeled by SFTA. This can be applied at the design
or code level. This analysis can lead to identifying software critical items and
components, the detection of software logic errors, the determination of the
initial conditions, and logical places for run time checks in the software.
[Ref. 14]
SFTA is designed to work backwards just as FTA does. The SFTA
attempts to verify that the program as written will not allow, under any
circumstance, an unsafe state to be reached. This type of analysis does not
deal with incorrect states that are not defined to be hazardous. Most of the
real-time systems that are dealt with have two goals in mind. One is
accomplishing the mission or function at hand. The second is to not cause
harm, while in the process of accomplishing the mission. SFTA only
addresses the second portion of stated the goals. [Ref. 14]
Proof by contradiction is conveniently used in SFTA since the goal of
the analysis is to prove that the software will not permit some event. If the
analysis can prove a contradiction to the loss event then the event cannot
happen with the software. SFTA forces the analyst to consider what the
software is not supposed to do. This thought process is opposite the normal
approach of what is the system software required to do. The environment is
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also considered by this approach. Therefore, the most critical assumptions
about the environment can also be considered. [Ref. 14]
F. PETRI NET ANALYSIS
Petri net theory was originally developed by A. W. Holt and others
based on the works of Carl Adam Petri [Ref. 16]. Petri's efforts were
directed to design a new model of information flow in a system. As
computer systems have developed, concurrency of operations have become
more and more common. This has lead to complex interactions between
concurrently executing components. This makes it nearly impossible to
understand the entire system. [Ref. 17]
Petri nets have been developed to aid in the understanding of concurrent
systems because they have the ability to model parallelism and
synchronization. This new approach realized that relationships between
components of a system could be represented by a graph or net. [Ref. 17]
The analysis by a Petri net can uncover possible problems within the
system and get them corrected. The ultimate goal would be the ability to
analyze a system using a Petri net and then manipulate the net to derive the
properties of the modeled system. Questions can be raised that significantly
enhance the ability to investigate the problem. For example, what states are
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reachable in a given Petri net? What different sequence of transition firings
are possible? [Ref. 17]
Petri nets are defined in computer science terms as directed graphs whose
nodes are transitions and places. Places are connected to transitions and
transitions are connected to places by directed arcs. Places model conditions
and transitions model the occurrence of an event. Inputs or arcs leading into
a transition represent the precondition of the event. The arcs leading from a
transition define its outputs or postconditions. Figure 2-1 represents the basic
Petri net structure.
Figure 2-1 Basic Petri Net Structure
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The circles of Figure 2-1 denote places, the bars are representative of
transitions, the dots represent tokens, and the arrows represent the arcs of the
graph.
Petri net graphs represent the static state or condition of the system under
analysis. In addition, Petri nets can also be used to analyze the dynamic
properties that result from execution. Each place can contain tokens that
model the dynamic properties of the system. Tokens are indicated by black
dots inside of the places as in Figure 2-1. A transition cannot fire if all the
tokens are not present. This then allows for simulation of the model so that
it can be analyzed under different sets of conditions. Tokens are positioned
and moved throughout the net by the firing of transitions. The transitions
must be enabled in order to fire. A transition is enabled when all of the input
places have a token in them. The number of arcs coming out of a transition
represents the number of tokens that will be created when the transition fires.
The transition fires by removing the enabling token from the input places and
depositing the newly created token or tokens into the output places. It should
be noted that there is no dependency between the number of input arcs
required to enable a given transition and that transition's number of output
arcs. Figure 2-1 depicts a basic net with input tokens set to fire.
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Figure 2-2 shows what has occurred after the transitions in Figure 2-1
have fired. The token is placed into the next place corresponding to the
number of input arcs that lead in.
Figure 2-2 Basic Petri Net Structures After Transitions Firing
A Petri net execution can be viewed as a series of discrete events that
can occur depending on the basic structure of the model being analyzed. This
is an important concept since this leads to the idea that Petri nets can fire in
a nondeterministic manner. If more then one transition is enabled the
possibility exists that any one of those transitions may fire, with the one that
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fires chosen nondeterministicly. The selection process can be purely random
or driven by forces that are not included in the model.
The nondeterministic actions of Petri nets matches well with events in
real life. This is ideal since real-life events occur in no specific set pattern.
Each occurrence can be a unique set of sequences. It is this fact that makes
Petri nets suitable for concurrent system modeling. However, this does
introduce considerable complexity into the analysis of the net.
A way to reduce the complexity of the Petri net model is to consider
that the firing of transitions is instantaneous or takes no time to fire. Since,
time is a continuous variable, then, the probability of any two or more events
happening simultaneously is zero [Ref. 17]. One other way to remove some
of the nondeterministic behavior is to set up timing maximums and minimums
for the transitions firing times. [Ref. 17]
1. Petri Net Theory
The formal definitions of Petri nets can be found in Peterson (1981).
A Petri net is a five tuple relationship. It consists of a set of places P, a set
of transitions T, an input function I, an output function O, and an initial
marking a. [Ref. 17]
2. Reachability
If there is a possible transition between one place to another then
we can say that the marking is immediately reachable. In other terms,
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reachability is the possibility that an initial condition could lead to a given
final condition. Reachability is a directed graphical representation of all the
possible state sequences. The nodes represent states. The arcs between the
nodes represent sets of transitions which sequentially go from one state to
another.
Petri net safety analysis find this advantageous because it uses
reachability to determine if there is a possibility of a mishap state occurring.
If a reachable unsafe state is discovered it can then be analyzed. The analyst
must determine where a critical state is first encountered. With this
information the error can be corrected by changing those conditions that led
to that specific critical high risk state. [Ref. 17]
G. COMBINING PETRI NETS AND FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
Petri nets and fault tree analysis (FTA) have been recently used in
conjunction with one another by Leveson and Stolzy, 1986 [Ref. 1]. They
have developed analysis procedures to help in determining software safety
requirements directly from the system under investigation. They have also
included timing requirements, recoverability, and fault tolerance to help in
determining failure detection and recovery procedures.
To generate the entire reachability graph from Petri nets has been shown
to be exponentially difficult and time consuming. However, by using Petri
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nets for only key parts of a system the same type of backward analysis that
is used in FTA can be used in the Petri net. The state information provided
by a fault tree can also be used to reduce the exponential nature of the Petri
net analysis.
Timing can also be added to the Petri net model. This approach can
help in determining the longest time required or worst case scenario required
to complete execution. This information can then be incorporated into the
design currently under development.
The Petri net incorporates faults and failures into the model. The
backward analysis helps uncover problem areas where critical hazards exist.
The analyst can then take the most hazardous part of the system and correct
it by using fault-tolerance and fail-safe mechanisms. If the hazard is too
severe it may need to be eliminated. [Ref. 1]
The above approach attempts to establish important properties of the
system through a framework of examination instead of guesswork. It uses the
advantages of timed Petri nets and the ability to model the flow of execution
with likely fault tree failure scenarios. It may be particularly useful for
software components. Since it is difficult to determine in a complex system
which faults are the most likely to occur and the number of failures is often
very large. [Ref. 1]
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in. MODELING AND ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
A. INTRODUCTION
The majority of fleet training with air-to-ground missiles is conducted
with live weapons. The real-time systems employed on different platforms
throughout the Navy have required thorough safety inspections and analysis.
The safety analysis of our system used the modeling power of Petri nets to
trace the flow of events as the system executed. This was critical to
analyzing the system considering that four computers were involved which
were working concurrently. Three of the computers were recent upgrades to
the aircraft. Relatively new interfaces were modeled and examined to
determine if any new hazardous conditions existed. With this increased
knowledge of the flow of information the unsafe states were identified. FTA
was then used to analyze if the unsafe states could possibly harm the system.
B. SYSTEM OPERATION
The real-time system under analysis is the upgrade of the A-6E
operational flight program (OFP 240). The improvements to the software are
a continuing program controlled and directed by NWC China Lake. The
upgrade, called OFP 250, will accomplish several tasks. It will combine
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OFP 230, used for older A-6E versions, and OFP 240 which includes the
1553 data bus and new computer hardware. OFP 250 will also add the
capability to perform missile practice attacks with the aircraft master arm
switch in the practice position.
Live missiles will be required to interface with the system. The practice
attack procedures will be identical to those required for a real missile attack.
The practice attack software will also encompass all current A-6E air-to-
ground missiles.
Our analysis of the system was conducted on OFP 240. The evaluation
examined the potential condition of an inadvertent release of a missile with
the master arm set to practice and a live weapon aboard the aircraft.
The A-6E, before the upgrade, used one central computer called the 4PI
or Ballistic Computer Set (BCS) to control the entire system. The new
configuration added three new computers along with the 1553 data bus. The
central or key component of the new system is the Avionics Interface Unit
(AIU). [Ref. 18]
In addition to the AIU there are two other computers that need to be
considered to understand some of the concurrent operations. These two
computers are the Missile Switching Unit (MSU) and the Integrated Missile
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Figure 3-1 System Block Diagram
The concurrent operations of all the individual system components is
very complex. We therefore started our analysis by using a timing diagram
to study the sequential flow of execution for a live air-to-ground missile
launch.
The specific missile that we considered was the Harpoon. Harpoon was
decided upon for a number of reasons. It was a proven weapon on the A-6E
airframe and is representative of other air launched missiles. It was also the
area in which most of our expertise and operator knowledge existed.
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Using the timing diagram and a schematic of the signals for the
input/output of the AIU, a simplified flow chart diagram was made. This
enabled us to better understand some of the concurrent events in the system.
The timing sequence was used to identify the signals from the Harpoon
missile. The AIU diagram was then used to help match and map the signals
that interfaced between the Harpoon and the hardware. Figure 3-2 is the
resulting simplified block diagram of the interface between the Harpoon and
AIU.
The Harpoon weapon was somewhat unique considering that it had been
implemented in older A-6E aircraft by using a 100-kHZ data channel. The
100-kHZ data channel is still used with the 1553 data bus in new or upgraded
versions of the aircraft. The analysis was forced to take this 100-kHZ bus
into account in examining safety-critical events. It did not, however, effect
our results. [Ref. 18]
C. PROBLEM BEING ANALYZED
Prior versions of OFP 240 did have some practice missile capabilities.
These capabilities, however, were restricted to the left and right outboard
stations. These stations are unable to be used by any type of weapon, either
live or practice. The circuitry to the outboard stations exists, but there is no
physical hardware that allows the weapon to be attached to the aircraft at
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Figure 3-2 Simplified Block Diagram
these stations. This limitation seriously degraded real-life training scenarios.
The ability of the system to interface between live weapons and the
computer for practice attacks had not been attempted previously. Realistic
training prior to this upgrade could only be conducted by placing the master
arm switch to on. This was not acceptable since this action caused the pilots
release mechanism to be armed and functioning.
In order to minimize the potential for an accident with a live weapon the
master arm switch must be positioned to practice. If this is the case then the
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system must be allowed to interface with the live missile. The practice
missile attack will, therefore, require the aircrew to perform all the steps
necessary to launch a real missile. The difference being that the missile will
not receive the actual fire pulse. [Ref. 18]
The portion of the problem that we began to focus on was after the
communication link between a live Harpoon and the computer had been
established. Could a missile inadvertently fire with the master arm set to
practice during the practice attack?
D. PETRI NET DESCRIPTION
The Petri net was developed to gain an understanding of what went on
with each individual signal during the firing sequence. Two nets were built,
one for a live missile fire and one for a practice missile fire. Our goal was
to examine the functionality of the nets to ensure that they behaved in the
same manner as our actual knowledge of the system.
The live fire net is represented in Figure 3-3. The area of main interest
centered around the commit high signal. There are several prior preconditions
that occur before the live fire can be initiated. Three of these signals occur
in both of the nets. These signals are the internal priority, station priority
output high, and the pilot control stick (PCS) input. The dashed lines in


















































Figure 3-3 Live Fire Net
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The input of the missile practice mode being false comes from the IMP.
This is a safety check to ensure that the operator has entered the correct type
of attack, either live or practice, in the IMP. This check must correspond to
the position of the master arm switch located on the armament control unit
(ACU) and the entered type of attack in the IMP.
The master arm/landing gear up (MA/LANGU) input is the last and most
important signal that appears in the preconditions for the live fire net. This
signal does not occur in the practice net. It must be set true or high and
remain high throughout the entire firing sequence. If for any reason the
signal goes low the firing sequence will be aborted.
Once the commit high signal from the PCS goes high the AIU begins
the launch sequence. The AIU responds by generating signals to the MSU
and ACU. These two signals are produced concurrently. The signal to the
MSU begins the interface with the actual Harpoon missile. This branch of the
net does not occur in the practice fire net and is a significant and important
difference between the two.
The other portion of the fire signal is sent from the AIU to the ACU.
When all preconditions are met, the ACU generates a firing pulse. This pulse
is sent back to the AIU. The AIU then transfers the firing pulse to the
pylons by way of a station missile release output signal and the weapon fires.
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The practice fire net is presented in Figure 3-4. It is somewhat simpler
considering that it does not rely on the MA/LANGU input. The initial
difference is a new input is introduced from the BCS labelled master arm
practice (MA PRAC). This signal is a new and separate signal to begin the
sequence for a practice attack with live weapons. The MA PRAC input also
has the same safety function implementation as in the IMP design from the
live fire net. The IMP and master arm switch position on the ACU must be
in agreement to work properly.
Once the commit high preconditions have been met the practice fire net
produces one signal versus the two found in the live fire net. The practice
net does not enter the path to the MSU and the subsequent interface between
the MSU and Harpoon. The Harpoon is thereby isolated by the practice fire
procedures and no signals are received by the missile during the critical firing
sequence.
The system continues and as the preconditions of the net are met the
AIU outputs the commit output high to the ACU. It will also output commit
true to the IMP and set the internal function commit conditions to true.
Finally, it will monitor the system for the ACU release signal from the BCS
contingent on a good or bad launch. The BCS then provides all the realistic
release parameters and signals to all other system components as if it were a














Figure 3-4 Fractice Fire Net
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may occur during the release of the weapon. The MA/LANGU procedures
would not be included because of their absence in the practice net.
E. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
Building on the knowledge obtained from the Petri net modeling the fault
tree analysis could begin. With the Petri net modeled and organized certain
information was discovered to be vital. The knowledge of certain
preconditions and paths in the net helped in assessing the fault tree analysis.
The MA/LANGU was a condition that only existed in the live fire case.
The live fire case also generated two signals after commit, one of which
actually interfaces with the Harpoon.
The practice fire case had a new input from the BCS that was
MA/PRAC. This was critical to the practice event occurring and also caused
the practice fire Petri net to be different than the live fire Petri net. The
practice fire case did not interface with the Harpoon during the firing
sequence.
The overall problem areas in the system can be reduced because of the
knowledge obtained from the Petri nets. In our specific case two scenarios
were studied. The first was the case of a Harpoon firing with the master arm
in practice with the commit occurring normally. The second condition or case
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occurred if a Harpoon fired with the master arm in practice with no commit
present.
The first case is presented in Figure 3-5. The Harpoon fires with the
master arm in practice. Discounting that a short circuit occurred in the
master arm switch, two paths are explored. First to the left, the fire signals
are sent from the AIU to the pylon. If this is the case, station missile release
signals would have to be high and this could only occur if the master arm is
in the on position. This is a contradiction to the initial loss event and
therefore could not happen.
The track of the MA/LANGU also continues down the tree and comes
to the master arm contradiction in each of its paths. The contradiction event
can be reached after the system has sent MA/LANGU to the AIU. If the
MA/LANGU signal is accurate, then the master arm must be on. This is not
the case and therefore causes a contradiction.
Following the right hand path of the tree the first condition reached is
that the missile is ready to fire. The ready to fire condition is followed by
the MSL enable signal. Finally, if the signal to the MSU is present, the
precondition for the event is that MA/LANGU must be true. The master arm
is in practice and therefore a contradiction is reached.
The second scenario that was discussed was the occurrence of a missile
firing without a commit present and the master arm in practice. The fault tree
36





Figure 3-5 Missile Fires With Commit
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for this scenario is represented in Figure 3-6. This tree also goes through
station missile release signals from the AIU to the pylon. However, in order
for this event to happen the commit high signal must be present. If this is
the case then the PCS input must be present from the pilots stick for the
commit to go high. The commit high signal for the initial loss event is not
present. A contradiction is identified and the analysis need proceed no
further.
F. SUMMARY
The analysis from the two scenarios shows that a Harpoon missile could
not be fired inadvertently. There were enough safeguards and design
techniques that ensured that a path to a live fire missile could not be reached
in a practice attack. Two cases of an analysis, however, does not mean that
there are not other problems areas that need to be investigated. Different
missiles may have different signals that are required. However, with the
addition of a separate output from the BCS to the AIU for practice attacks the
design appears to enable safe practice attacks with live Harpoon missiles.
The additional safeguards built into the IMP and ACU switch settings
also help ensure safe operations of the system. These are excellent ways to




















Figure 3-6 Missile Fires Without Commit
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There are cases and scenarios in any system that can not be identified
or thought of at the time of the design and implementation. Therefore, a
methodology of putting the system through an analysis of some type to reduce
the amount of unsafe states is advantageous. There will be failure scenarios
that need to be continually identified and analyzed by experts to ensure the
system continues to meet safety criteria.
In examining the two specific cases we looked at the inadvertent release
and accidental possibilities of a Harpoon firing. The interlocks in the design
of the system block these events from occurring.
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IV. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. REVIEW
The software safety analysis of a concurrent system in a multiple and
distinct CPU environment is a complex one. This problem is certain to
become more complex and complicated in the near future. Systems under
consideration, such as the A- 12 aircraft, the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF),
and some portion of space defense will have large numbers of interacting
subsystems.
These systems will also control and be responsible for more and more
safety critical functions. The environment in which they operate will also be
more demanding. Design faults and problems must be determined at earlier
points in the software development cycle. Increasing costs and complexities
are just two reasons answers must be found. New methodologies need to be
discovered and perfected to insure that sophisticated hardware and software
does not cause catastrophic incidents and accidents.
This thesis has investigated (proposed) a method for using the power of
Petri nets to model concurrent systems in a multiple CPU environment. The
information obtained from the modeling of the net will help reduce the
number of cases that need to be analyzed. With the knowledge of the system
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well understood examining the reduced set of loss events can occur with fault
tree analysis. FTA can then look at each individual loss event and decide on
the feasibility of the event actually occurring.
The sample system we chose is a proposed upgrade to an already
existing operational flight program (OFP 240) for the A-6E Grumman aircraft.
The modeling and safety analysis for this system examined a real-time system
currently in the United States Navy inventory.
The analysis initially used Petri net modeling to begin to break down and
organize complex interactions of the system. Using the methodologies of Petri
nets all aspects of the system functionality were analyzed, including the
different internal interfaces to other computers. The analysis then moved into
a constructed block diagram to allow for an examination of individual
components and a thorough study of component operation, control flow, and
system interfaces.
The model centered around the AIU that is the heart of the new system.
The Petri net modeling technique was used to understand the concurrent
aspects of the AIU with the Harpoon air-to-ground weapon. The Harpoon
was used since it was representative of other weapons that could interface
with the AIU.
Key signals and information routes were determined after the live fire
and practice fire nets were modeled. Differences between the two nets were
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identified. This gave the analyst a sense of where problems could occur in
the firing sequence.
Once the live and practice fire nets were understood the analysis moved
into FTA. The nets allow the analyst to ascertain the loss event scenarios that
required the most attention. The analysis of these loss events, however, is
time consuming. Automatic tools are being developed to assist in this area
of analysis and need to be developed further.
In our scenario two loss events were analyzed. The analysis begins by
describing the loss event and follows the standard technique of FTA. The
loss event in each case was the root of the tree. The events or nodes below
were the necessary preconditions that were needed for the hazard to occur.
It was shown in each case that there were many places in which a
contradiction was identified. Therefore, it was determined that neither loss
event could occur. There were sufficient safeguards in the design that
prohibited the inadvertent release of a Harpoon in a practice attack.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
We have demonstrated the feasibility of applying Petri net modeling to
a complex concurrent problem of software safety analysis. We then used this
information to create specific fault tree applications. We did not design a
formal model of these conditions.
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The methodologies presented are only a preliminary step in creating a
complete set of rules to identify when Petri nets and fault tree analysis can
be used. Leveson and Stolzy, for example, have used a methodology of
simulating system faults within a Petri net model. Their techniques added
fault transitions to the net to cause unintended events or prevented intended
events from occurring [Ref. 1].
Petri nets are excellent for modeling the concurrent actions of a system.
Petri nets are also strongly suited for timing constraints. Systems that proceed
in parallel and need real-time synchronization benefit from Petri net modeling.
FTA can then be used for logical event analysis and specific problem solving
techniques.
Petri nets, however, are difficult and time consuming to analyze. In
order to analyze a complex concurrent system automatic tools are needed.
The reachability graphs must be generated automatically by tools. Any valid
technique to reduce the time and enormous number of paths in a problem will
be essential for the future.
In a complex software system consideration needs to be given to which
techniques will help provide the best possible support for analyzing the
system. Problems will occur during the design of a complex system. Most
of these problems will be detected and corrected. There must, however, be
techniques to uncover hidden problems. The application of Petri nets and
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fault tree analysis techniques can make a difference in building and designing
better systems.
In a system with a complex set of concurrent operations, Petri net
methods should be used first to drive the fault tree analysis. The concurrent
operations are better suited to be analyzed by Petri net models initially. Once
the complex system is understood problem areas can be better analyzed. FTA
can then be used where experts think major problems are likely to occur.
In a situation or system where events in a fault tree depend on specific
concurrent states being reached, fault tree methods should drive the analysis.
Fault tree analysis is better suited for analyzing specific events. Petri nets
can be then used to model the particular concurrent events in the actual tree.
Deciding on which approach to use is a function of the system under analysis.
One of the major concerns with Petri net methods is the difficulty in
constructing graphs to model the actual system. This is a complex task and
is an area that is currently undergoing major research initiatives.
Integrated tools are one approach that is being investigated to reduce the
time and complexities of Petri net analysis. We recommend that this thrust
should also include tools that support not only Petri nets or fault tree analysis
but both. The information that is obtained from these two techniques is
certainly vital to overall system performance.
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These tools, once designed, should be integrated. The information
obtained in a Petri net model may also be able to be used by a fault tree
analysis. Questions arise with regards to what portions of the information in
the analysis are common to both techniques. Work in the field of Petri nets
and FTA must be done on the inter-relationships between these two
techniques. Petri nets are versatile enough to enable accurate modeling of
many concurrent system aspects. They capture the features of system
interfaces and paths of execution and are dynamic assets.
Fault trees are essentially a static analysis. They can, however, detect
software logic errors and multiple failure sequences that may have essential
information that can be shared with Petri net analysis.
Other concurrent modeling techniques also need to be explored. One
example is communicating finite state machines with shared variables, a
technique that allows for direct representation of race conditions. Race
conditions, where two processes write to the same location simultaneously,
have been shown to contribute to some past mishaps.
We have introduced a technique to combine Petri nets and fault tree
analysis. These combined techniques have the possibility to help in
determining the future of safety analysis. Answers need to be found to ensure
that critical software components can be judged to be safe. Software errors,
including simple oversights, must not be the cause of accidents or incidents
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once the software is introduced for public use. Therefore, we strongly




Failure The inability of a system or system component to
perform a required function within specified limits. A






A system which limits the amount of damage caused
by a fault. No attempt is made to satisfy the
functional specifications except where necessary to
ensure safety.
A condition with the potential for causing loss of life
or property.
A hazard at the top level of a fault tree that, if the
event occurred, could cause a mishap.
The probability that a system, including all hardware
and software subsystems, will perform a required task





The ability of the system to avoid safety failures.
A failure which leads to casualties or serious
consequences. A serious consequence is any undesired
event which the designer considers to be as or more
important than the correct (reliable) operation of the
system.
One which prevents unsafe states from causing safety
failures.
Software Error A human action or inaction (during development or
maintenance) which results in software containing a
fault.
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Software Fault - A manifestation of an error in software. A fault, if
encountered, may cause a failure.
Software Safety - The ability of the software system to avoid safety
failures caused by software errors.
Unsafe State - A state from which there are circumstances where




The rectangle indicates an event to be analyzed further.
The circle indicates a basic fault event or primary
failure of a component. It requires no further
development, and its probability of occurrence is
derived from the generic rate of the part.
The house is used for events which normally occur in
the system. It represents the continued operation of the
component, and its probability is the reliability of the
part.
The diamond is used for non-primal events which are
not developed further for lack of information or
insufficient consequence.
The oval is used to indicate a condition. It defines the
state of the system that permits a fault sequence to
occur. It may be normal or result from failures.
r\ The AND gate serves to indicate that all input events
are required in order to cause the output event.
The OR gate indicates that one or more of the input
events are required to produce the gated events.
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